Trust is important in interpersonal relations, and has key normative dimensions. But is it of significance in epistemology? The epistemic dimension of evaluation of beliefs pertains to their truth, and surely only evidence can bear on this? That thought suggests that trust can have no role in the justification of belief. Yet it is very natural to say that, when one forms a belief from testimony, on a speaker’s say-so, one does so in virtue of trusting the speaker. I give an analytic account of trust fit to play this role. I contrast it with a richer account that invokes normative second-personal reasons for trust. Both my account, and the richer one, are non-doxastic accounts: they do not entail that the truster believes the trustee to be trustworthy. I show how this affords the scope for trust to work epistemic magic: to allow one to attain justified beliefs accessible only via trust, not via evidence. I reject this option; but my analysis makes sense of ‘assurance’ accounts of testimony, on which trust of the addressee in the speaker can allow her justifiedly to believe what she is told, when mere overhearers have no basis for this.