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*Ethics and Liberal Naturalism*

Moral objectivism can be defined in some similar, if not perfectly, equivalent ways:

1. Moral claims are truth-apt, and sometimes they are true.
2. Some universal moral principles are valid for all agents.
3. In metaethics, error-theory, subjectivism, illusionism, skepticism, non-cognitivism, and relativism are all wrong.
4. Moral progress is possible.
5. There are cases in which moral disagreement can be rationally solved.

Prima facie, all these statements sound very plausible, but showing that they are correct is all another matter. A promising way of dealing with this issue is to consider it from the perspective of philosophical naturalism – or, to better say, from the different points of view of the two most important forms of contemporary philosophical naturalism, that is, *scientific naturalism* (the view that in principle natural sciences completely define our ontology and our epistemology) and *liberal naturalism* (the view that ontology and epistemology are broader than those defined by natural sciences but all the beliefs that are incompatible with the scientific worldview are unacceptable).

The opposition between moral objectivism and moral non-objectivism is orthogonal to the opposition between scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism. In fact, some advocates of scientific realism are moral objectivists (such as the Cornell and the Michigan schools), some are not (such as Mackie and other moral error-theorists); and the same is true of the liberal naturalist faction. That said, in my talk I'll argue that liberal naturalism is the best option for those who want to defend moral realism.